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The inclusion fallacy is a phenomenon in which generalization from a specific premise cat-
egory to a more general conclusion category is considered stronger than a generalization
to a specific conclusion category nested within the more general set. Such inferences
violate rational norms and are part of the reasoning fallacy literature that provides inter-
esting tasks to explore cognitive and neural basis of reasoning. To explore the functional
neuroanatomy of the inclusion fallacy, we used a 2×2 factorial design, with factors for
quantification (explicit and implicit) and response (fallacious and non-fallacious). It was
found that a left fronto-temporal system, along with a superior medial frontal system,
was specifically activated in response to fallacious responses consistent with a semantic
biasing of judgment explanation. A right fronto-parietal system was specifically recruited
in response to detecting conflict associated with the heightened fallacy condition. These
results are largely consistent with previous studies of reasoning fallacy and support a
multiple systems model of reasoning.
Keywords: fMRI, inductive reasoning, prefrontal cortex, inclusion fallacy, category-based induction
INTRODUCTION
As rational beings, we look to reasons to motivate and justify our
actions. However, a long series of cognitive studies suggest that
we make systematic errors while reasoning. Perhaps the most per-
vasive errors have to do with the impact of our belief structures
on logical reasoning (Wilkins, 1928; Evans et al., 1983). Several
imaging studies have examined the neural basis of belief bias (i.e.,
the inclination to agree or disagree with an argument based upon
whether we find the conclusion believable or unbelievable) in syl-
logistic reasoning (Goel et al., 2000; Goel and Dolan, 2003). The
basic finding is that the left frontal–temporal system is recruited for
logical reasoning in the presence of semantic content about which
subjects have beliefs, and a right frontal and bilateral parietal sys-
tem is engaged where such beliefs are absent (Goel et al., 2000) or
need to be overcome to generate the logical response (Goel and
Dolan, 2003). Where the beliefs are not overcome, a ventral medial
frontal system is engaged (Goel and Dolan, 2003). The goal of the
current study is to see if these mechanisms generalize to more
informal reasoning domains, such as category-based induction.
Category-based induction is a reasoning process by which we
project knowledge about certain classes of entities to other related
classes of entities (e.g., inferring that ostriches have gene X from
the fact that robins have gene X). Inductive generalization from the
known to the unknown enables us to benefit from past instances
and enlarge the scope of our knowledge. There is a phenomenon
within this domain, known as the inclusion fallacy. The inclusion
fallacy is a phenomenon in which generalization from a specific
category to a more general category (e.g., from robin to bird) is
considered to be stronger or more convincing than generalization
to a more specific category (e.g., to ostrich) nested within the more
general set. Consider the following examples from Osherson et al.
(1990):
Robins secrete uric acid crystals
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Birds secrete uric acid crystals
and
Robins secrete uric acid crystals
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Ostriches secrete uric acid crystals.
Subjects are presented with pairs of arguments, such as these, and
required to make a direct comparison of their relative strength.
Many (but not all) people sometimes (but not always) fallaciously
choose the first argument as stronger than the second, and thus,
commit the inclusion fallacy (since the conclusion of the second
argument is contained in the conclusion of the first, it can not be
stronger).
The individual arguments are inductive and have no logically
correct response. However, as typically administered (Osherson
et al., 1990), the task forces subjects to make a direct comparison
of the relative strength of the two arguments. There is a logi-
cally correct response to this critical component of the task. It
is to say that the generalization to all birds cannot be stronger
than the generalization to a specific bird (and vice versa). This
response is, however, excluded by the task setup. Subjects must
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choose one or the other as being “stronger,” there being no option
to say “same strength”1. None the less, it seems to defy ratio-
nal plausibility norms to assert a property to all birds but not
a specific bird.
The inclusion fallacy seems to reflect the perceived relation-
ship between the subjects in the premise and conclusion. The link
between robin and bird is quite strong because robin is considered
to be a typical/central member of the bird category. But an ostrich,
despite being a bird, is an atypical/peripheral member of the bird
category and is somewhat removed from the representation of
robin. In this sense, the phenomenon of inclusion fallacy is simi-
lar to the conjunction fallacy in the Linda problem2 (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1983) and the belief-bias effect in deductive reasoning
(Evans et al., 1983; Goel and Dolan, 2003; Evans and Curtis-
Holmes, 2005; De Neys, 2006a,b), in that the fallacious response
is biased by the organization of our world knowledge. However,
participants will sometimes overlook the more constrained/logical
response and answer on the basis of their knowledge about birds,
robins, and ostriches. The inference is biased toward the more
familiar/easily accessible category (bird over ostrich).
Not all participants are susceptible to the inclusion fallacy, and
those that are do not fall prey to it on all occasions. One factor that
may affect participants’ susceptibility to the fallacy is the quantifier
associated with the conclusion. In the stimuli used by Osherson
et al. (1990), e.g., “birds secrete uric acid crystals,” the quanti-
fier is only implied, leaving room for ambiguity. If one assumes a
strict universal quantifier (e.g.,“all birds secrete uric acid crystals”)
then one should be more aware of the fact that the superordi-
nate category (i.e., bird) subsumes the subordinate category (i.e.,
ostrich), which should in turn reduce the inclusion fallacy. How-
ever, if one does not assume strict universal quantification, then
one may be less likely to subsume the subordinate category in the
superordinate category. For example, the participant may reason
that perhaps the sentence means “most birds or virtually all birds.
And after all, ostriches are not real birds.” Under such an inter-
pretation one is more likely to make the inclusion fallacy. Thus,
the absence of an explicit “all” should increase uncertainty and
the inclusion fallacy while the presence of an explicit “all” should
decrease uncertainty and the fallacy response. That the presence
of an explicit or implicit quantifier should modulate the inclu-
sion fallacy is consistent with the psychological literature on the
interpretation of quantifiers (Collins and Quillian, 1969; Newstead
and Griggs, 1984). It is also consistent with a related study (Slo-
man, 1998) that shows that fallacious inferences (specifically, the
inclusion similarity)3 can be modulated by making the category
of inclusion relations explicit.
1It remains an open question whether the fallacious response would persist if a
“same strength” option was made available to participants.
2Like the inclusion fallacy, the conjunction fallacy requires a contrivance whereby
the one piece of information that appears individually and in the conjunct (i.e.,
Linda is a bank teller) is not in keeping with the description of Linda, whereas the
other half of the conjunct is.
3Inclusion similarity is the phenomenon whereby the first argument below is con-
sidered stronger (or more convincing) than the second argument: (A) all animals use
norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter. Therefore, all mammals use norepinephrine
as a neurotransmitter. (B) All animals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter.
Therefore, all reptiles use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter. The rationale is
To understand the neural basis of the inclusion fallacy, and its
modulation by explicit and implicit quantifiers, we undertook an
fMRI study of healthy volunteers while they engaged in general-
ization inferences on material similar to Osherson et al. (1990). At
the behavioral level, we anticipated that a subset of the participants
would display the inclusion fallacy and that the fallacy would be
displayed much more frequently in the implicit quantifier condi-
tion than the explicit quantifier condition. At the neural level, we
were interested in the mechanisms underlying responses biased
by beliefs and knowledge structures (i.e., the fallacious responses)
versus responses in which these beliefs and knowledge structures
were bypassed/suppressed to generate non-fallacious responses.
We expected these systems to be modulated by the explicit/implicit
quantifier condition. Based on the fact that fallacious responses
are driven by the organization of our beliefs, we predicted involve-
ment of a left hemisphere frontal–temporal system, including left
middle/inferior frontal gyrus and middle temporal gyrus in this
condition as seen in several previous reasoning studies (Goel et al.,
2000; Goel and Dolan, 2004). Reasoning trials uninfluenced by
beliefs (i.e., the non-fallacious responses in the present study), on
the other hand, should activate a parietal system, often found in
reasoning trials devoid of beliefs (Goel et al., 2000; Waechter et al.,
2012). The task paradigm contains a tension/conflict between the
fallacious and non-fallacious responses. This is exasperated in the
implicit quantifier condition where the uncertain scope of the
quantifier leaves room for doubt (see Discussion). In this situa-
tion, we predicted activation in right frontal PFC in response to
conflict detection, particularly in the case of non-fallacy responses
(Goel et al., 2000; Goel and Dolan, 2003; De Neys et al., 2008;
Stollstorff et al., 2011).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Sixty-two paid healthy undergraduate and postgraduate students
participated in the experiment. All subjects were right-handed and
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of the subjects
reported any history of neurological or psychiatric diseases. The
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Xuanwu Hospital,
Capital Medical University. All participants gave written informed
consent.
STIMULI AND DESIGN
One hundred twenty trials, modeled on the Osherson et al. (1990)
stimuli, were included in the current study. Each trial was com-
posed of pairs of arguments, one appearing above the other (see
Table 1). The ordering of the arguments was counterbalanced. The
subjects were instructed to judge, and indicate, which one of the
two arguments was stronger.
The stimuli were divided into two conditions (see Table 1),
explicit quantification (60), and implicit quantification (60). Sub-
jects’ responses to each trial were used to further divide the stimuli
into fallacy or non-fallacy response trials. A fallacious response
would be one where the participant chose the argument “robins
secrete uric acid crystals, therefore, birds secrete uric acid crystals”
that the class of mammals is considered to be more representative or similar to the
class of animals than is the class of reptiles.
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Table 1 | Example of experimental tasks.
Explicit Implicit
Argument 1 (typical
to atypical)
All robins secrete
uric acid crystals
Robins secrete
uric acid crystals
All ostriches secrete
uric acid crystals
Ostriches secrete
uric acid crystals
Argument 2 (typical
to general)
All robins secrete
uric acid crystals
Robins secrete
uric acid crystals
All birds secrete uric
acid crystals
Birds secrete uric
acid crystals
as being stronger or more convincing than “robins secrete uric
acid crystals, therefore, ostriches secrete uric acid crystals.” The
reverse selection (i.e., where the latter is stronger or more con-
vincing than the former) would be the non-fallacious correct
selection. This yielded a 2× 2 factorial design, with factors for
quantification (explicit and implicit) and response (fallacious or
non-fallacious), resulting in the following four cells: implicit fal-
lacy (I_F), implicit non-fallacy (I_NF), explicit fallacy (E_F), and
explicit non-fallacy (E_NF).
STIMULI PRESENTATION
Stimuli from all conditions were organized into two sessions and
presented randomly in an event related design. The order of ses-
sions was counterbalanced among subjects. Trials began with the
presentation of one of the arguments (premise plus conclusion).
Two seconds later, the second argument (premise plus conclusion)
was presented and subjects were given 8 s to respond. Half of the
participants used a left button press to indicate that the first argu-
ment was stronger and the right button press to indicate that the
second argument was stronger. The other half of the participants
used the reverse. The two arguments remained on the screen until
the end of the trial or the subjects’ button-press response. Subjects
were instructed to respond as accurately and quickly as possible
and move to the next trial if the stimuli advanced before they
could respond. The length of trials varied from 9 to 11 s (with a
TR/2 jitter), i.e., the length of the trials may be 9, 10, or 11 s with
the same probability, randomly. This was determined by pilot data
indicating that the range of the inter-trial interval was 7–9 s, with
a reaction time of around 3 s. There were 60 event presentations
during a session and each session lasted 10 min.
MRI DATA ACQUISITION
Scanning was performed on a 3.0-T MRI system (Siemens Trio
Tim; Siemens Medical System, Erlanger, Germany) and with a
12-channel phased array head coil. Foam padding and head-
phones were used to limit head motion and reduce scanning
noise. High-resolution structural images were acquired using
a T1 weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence (TR/TE= 1600/2.25 ms,
TI= 800 ms, 192 sagittal slices, FOV= 256 mm, 9° flip angle, voxel
size= 1 mm× 1 mm× 1 mm). Functional images were obtained
using a T2* gradient-echo EPI sequence (TR/TE= 2000/31 ms,
90° flip angle, 64× 64 matrix size in 240 mm× 240 mm FOV).
Thirty axial slices with a thickness of 4 mm and an interslice gap
of 0.8 mm were acquired and paralleled to the AC–PC line. The
scanner was synchronized with the presentation of every trial.
DATA PREPROCESSING
Data were analyzed using SPM5 software4. The first four images for
each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
The remaining fMRI images were first corrected for within-scan
acquisition time differences between slices and then realigned to
the first volume to correct for inter-scan head motions (head
movements were <1 voxel in all cases). The structural image
was co-registered to the mean functional image created from the
realigned images using a linear transformation. The transformed
structural images were then segmented into gray matter (GM),
white matter (WM), and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) by using a
unified segmentation algorithm (Ashburner and Friston, 2005).
The realigned functional volumes were spatially normalized to
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space and re-sampled
to 3 mm isotropic voxels using the normalization parameters
estimated during unified segmentation. The registration of the
functional data to the template was checked for each individ-
ual subject. Subsequently, the functional images were spatially
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm× 8 mm× 8 mm full
width at half maximum (FWHM) to decrease spatial noise.
fMRI ANALYSIS
For all trials, the epoch of interest extends from the presen-
tation of the first argument to the response. The BOLD sig-
nal was modeled using canonical HRF with temporal deriva-
tive implemented in SPM5. Condition effects at each voxel were
estimated according to the general linear model and region-
ally specific effects were compared using linear contrasts. Each
contrast produced a statistical parametric map (SPM) of the t -
statistic, which was subsequently transformed to a unit normal
Z -distribution. The contrast images were then used in a random
effect analysis to determine the regions most consistently activated
across subjects. The contrasts of primary interest in the present
study are the main effect of fallacy (F–NF, NF–F), explicitness
(I–E and E–I), and the interaction effects [(I_F–I_NF)–(E_F–
E_NF) and (E_F–E_NF)–(I_F–I_NF)]. The activations reported
survived a voxel-level threshold of p< 0.001 and a cluster size
comprised of a minimum of eight contiguous voxels, which
corresponded to a corrected p< 0.05 using the AlphaSim pro-
gram5 (parameters: FWHMx= 12.23 mm, FWHMy= 10.39 mm,
FWHMz= 9.67 mm, within the GM mask). The real smoothness
in the three directions was estimated by using 3dFWHMx.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE
Of the 62 subjects, 58 exhibited the fallacy at least once in the
implicit condition and 54 exhibited the fallacy at least once in the
explicit condition. To ensure adequate signal-to-noise ratio, and
to allow for within subject analyses, we used a cut off of at least
12 trials in the fallacy and logical response conditions to select
participants for fMRI analyses. Fifteen subjects (7 females) with a
4http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
5http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/manual/AlphaSim.pdf
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mean age of 23.6± 3.1 years met this criterion and were included
in the subsequent fMRI data analysis. The initial behavioral analy-
sis, below, includes all 62 participants. The subsequent analysis is
limited to 15 participants used in the fMRI analysis. The pattern
of results in the two cases is identical.
Behavioral scores were in keeping with expectations (see
Figure 1). In terms of responses from all 62 participants, we
found a main effect of response [F(1,61)= 3.81, p= 0.05], such
that the number of non-fallacious responses were greater than
the number of fallacious responses. There was also a quantifica-
tion (explicit, implicit) by response (fallacy, non-fallacy) interac-
tion [F(1,61)= 23.97, p= 0.00] (see Figure 1A), driven by the
fact that there were more non-fallacious responses than falla-
cious responses in the explicit quantifier trials [F(1,61)= 15.54,
p= 0.00], but there was no difference in the number of
non-fallacious and fallacious responses in the implicit trials
[F(1,61)= 0.02, p= 0.90].
In terms of reaction times, there was a main effect of
response [F(1,49)= 6.15, p= 0.017], with participants taking
longer to respond in trials in which they commit the inclu-
sion fallacy (see Figure 1A). The main effect of quantification
[F(1,49)= 0.24, p= 0.62] and the quantification by response
interaction [F(1,49)= 2.68, p= 0.11] were not significant. The
post hoc analysis of RTs also showed that the RT for fallacy trials
was significantly longer than that for non-fallacy response trials in
the explicit condition [F(1,52)= 4.20, p= 0.046] but not in the
implicit condition [F(1,55)= 2.28, p= 0.14]. (Note: as there are
NULL values for RT in some conditions for several subjects, the
degrees of freedom are not always 61, but variable).
We then analyzed the results of the 15 subjects that will be
included in the fMRI analyses (see Figure 1B). In terms of accuracy
responses, we found a main effect of response [F(1,14)= 24.47,
p= 0.00], such that the number of non-fallacious responses was
greater than the number of fallacious responses, and a quantifica-
tion (explicit, implicit) by response (fallacy, non-fallacy) interac-
tion [F(1,14)= 11.70, p= 0.004], again driven by the fact that the
difference between non-fallacious and fallacious responses was
greater in the explicit trials than the implicit trials. In terms of
reaction times, the effects were not significant, but the pattern was
similar to that of the 62 subjects.
fMRI RESULTS
As noted above, the fMRI results are based on 15 of the 62
participants who had at least 12 trials in each of the 4 conditions.
The main effect of response (Table 2), derived from com-
parisons of trials with fallacious and non-fallacious responses
(F–NF), revealed activation of bilateral superior/medial frontal
gyrus (BA 8), left inferior frontal gyrus/insula (BA45, 13), and
left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21, 22) in the fallacy trials
(Table 2; Figure 2). The reverse comparison, of the main effect of
FIGURE 1 | (A) Behavioral performance of 62 subjects and (B) the 15 subjects with enough trials for the further fMRI data analysis. The error bars represent
the SEM.
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Table 2 | Main effect of fallacy and explicitness and the interaction
effect of fallacy by explicitness.
Brain regions MNI
coordinate
BA Cluster
size
T -score
x y z
F–NF
Medial·Superior frontal gyrus 3 33 48 8 17 5.23
Lt. middle temporal gyrus −66 −39 −6 21 28 5.21
Lt. middle temporal gyrus −63 −36 3 22 4.58
Lt. inferior frontal gyrus/insula −39 15 9 45/13 17 4.81
−30 24 6 45 4.64
Lt. medial frontal gyrus −3 36 48 8 12 4.60
NF–F
No significant activation
E–I
No significant activation
I–E
Rt. inferior parietal lobule 42 −54 48 40 10 5.02
Rt. superior parietal lobule 36 −57 54 7 3.87
(I_F–I_NF)–(E_F–E_NF)
Rt. superior parietal lobule 27 −57 45 7 33 4.74
Rt. precuneus 24 −72 51 7 3.37
Lt. fusiform gyrus −48 −57 −15 37 10 4.22
Rt. middle frontal gyrus 48 33 18 46 10 3.70
(E_F–E_NF)–(I_F–I_NF)
No significant activation
response, non-fallacious versus fallacious trials (NF–F), revealed
no significant activations.
The main effect of quantification, derived from comparisons
of implicit minus explicit trials, revealed activation of right supe-
rior/inferior parietal lobule (BA 40, 7) (Table 2; Figure 3). The
reverse comparison, explicit minus implicit quantifiers, revealed
no significant activations.
We next examined the interaction between response and quan-
tification. The difference between fallacious and non-fallacious
responses in implicit condition trials [(I_F–I_NF)–(E_F–E_NF)],
resulted in greater activation in right middle frontal gyrus (BA
46), right superior parietal lobule (BA 7), and left fusiform gyrus
(BA 37) than the difference between fallacious and non-fallacious
responses in the explicit condition trials (Table 2; Figure 4). No
regions of significant activation were found in the reverse direction
[(I_NF–I_F)–(E_NF–E_F)].
Additionally, in order to exclude the potential effect of task dif-
ficulty on the activations, we performed another analysis using RT
of each trial as covariates. These results are reported in Table S1 in
Supplementary Material. It was found that almost all activations
survived the supplementary analysis, indicating that the results
were not driven by task difficulty differences between trial types.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with previous literature (Osherson et al., 1990; Shafir
et al., 1990), our results demonstrate susceptibility to the inclusion
fallacy in a subset of participants. Furthermore, we demonstrate
that the fallacy is indeed modulated by the explicitness of the
quantifier. The presence of an explicit universal quantifier signifi-
cantly reduces the rate of fallacious responses. This may be because
the explicit quantifier eliminates ambiguity regarding the scope of
the general category and increases the likelihood that the general
category will subsume the more specific category.
Our main aim is to explore the neural basis of this fallacy
and its modulation by explicit quantification. Consistent with our
first neural prediction we found that committing the fallacy was
associated with a predominantly left hemisphere frontal–temporal
system, including the left inferior frontal gyrus/insula and middle
temporal gyrus. This is a semantic system found to be involved in
inductive reasoning and belief-based deductive reasoning (Goel
et al., 2000; Goel and Dolan, 2004). The involvement of this
system in the fallacious response trials is consistent with the pos-
sibility that fallacious responses in this paradigm are driven by a
combination of the organization of our knowledge base (i.e., typ-
icality/centrality effects), which sometimes exclude ostriches from
the class of birds, and an overweighting of the resulting belief-
based response over the more rationally plausible response. The
activity in bilateral medial/superior frontal cortex may be associ-
ated with attentional orientation response (Hopfinger et al., 2000;
Rushworth et al., 2004; Woldorff et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2008).
Despite our prediction of parietal activation, we did not find
significant activation in the reverse condition (non-fallacious
responses versus fallacious responses). One possible explanation
for the lack of finding in this comparison is that, unlike the syllogis-
tic reasoning paradigm, where the logical response is much more
complex and effortful, in the present paradigm the non-fallacious
response is trivial, so activations associated with it may have been
subsumed by the fallacy condition.
In terms of the quantification factor, the absence of the
explicit quantifier significantly increased the number of fallacious
responses and decreased the number of non-fallacious responses.
The neural correlates of this can be seen in the activation of
right inferior and superior parietal lobule in the comparison of
implicit versus explicit conditions. The implicit condition intro-
duces some uncertainty into the task by increasing ambiguity.
Parameter estimates (Figure 4) indicate that this activation is
driven by the difference in implicit fallacious versus implicit non-
fallacious responses. We consider this activation below, in the
discussion of the interaction results.
The explicit minus implicit comparison, on the other hand,
revealed no significant activation. As above, it is possible that,
given the explicit condition had a preponderance of non-fallacious
responses, and that the non-fallacious condition is quite trivial (if
the fallacious response is never considered), activations associ-
ated with the explicit quantifier condition may be subsumed by
activations in the implicit quantifier condition.
Focusing on the response by quantifier interaction highlights
the critical role of right lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal lobule
system in reasoning. As this is an interaction analysis, and con-
trols for the presence of fallacy and non-fallacy responses, one can
interpret the result as being driven by the greater uncertainty in
the implicit condition rather than general semantic requirements
of the fallacy responses (as in the main effect). (Examination of
the parameter estimates clearly indicates that the effect is driven
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FIGURE 2 | A statistical parametric map (SPM) rendered into standard
stereotactic space. A comparison of fallacy trials versus non-fallacy trials
(F_NF) results in activation in left inferior frontal gyrus/insula (MNI: −39, 15, 9;
T =4.81) (BA 45/13), left middle temporal gyrus (MNI: −66, −39, −6;
T =5.21) (BA 21/22), left medial frontal gyrus (MNI: −3, 36, 48; T = 4.60) (BA
8), and right superior frontal gyrus (MNI: 3, 33, 48; T =5.23) (BA 8) [also see
the main effect of (F–NF) inTable 2]. Condition specific parameter (beta)
estimates show that the left fronto-temporal system and bilateral mesial
frontal gyrus are specifically responding to fallacy trials in both implicit and
explicit conditions. The error bars represent the SEM. The activations reported
survived an uncorrected voxel-level intensity threshold of p<0.001 with a
minimum cluster size of 10 contiguous voxels, which corresponds to a
corrected p<0.05 (using the AlphaSim program as described in Section
Materials and Methods).
FIGURE 3 | A statistical parametric map (SPM) rendered into standard
stereotactic space. A comparison of implicit trials versus explicit trials (I–E)
results in activation in right inferior/superior parietal lobule (MNI: 42, −54,
48/36, −57, 54; T =5.02/3.87) (BA 40/7) [also see the main effect of (I–E) in
Table 2]. Condition specific parameter (beta) estimates show that the right
parietal area is responding to fallacy trials in both implicit and explicit
conditions, but the main effect in this region is mainly driven by the implicit
fallacy trials. The error bars represent the SEM. The activations reported
survived an uncorrected voxel-level intensity threshold of p<0.001 with a
minimum cluster size of 10 contiguous voxels, which corresponds to a
corrected p<0.05 (using the AlphaSim program as described in Section
Materials and Methods).
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FIGURE 4 | A statistical parametric map (SPM) rendered into standard
stereotactic space. The quantification (explicit, implicit) by response
(fallacious, non-fallacious) interaction, i.e., a comparison of the difference
between implicit fallacy trials versus implicit non-fallacy trials with the
difference between explicit fallacy trials versus explicit non-fallacy trials
[(I_F–I_NF)–(E_F–E_NF)], results in activation in right middle frontal gyrus
(MNI: 48, 33, 18; T =3.70) (BA 46) and superior parietal lobule (MNI: 27,
−57, 45; T =4.74) (BA 7) [also see the interaction effect of
(I_F–I_NF)–(E_F–E_NF) inTable 2]. Condition specific parameter (beta)
estimates show that the right fronto-parietal system is specifically
responding to fallacies with implicit items, but not to fallacies with explicit
items. The error bars represent the SEM. The activations reported survived
an uncorrected voxel-level intensity threshold of p<0.01 with a minimum
cluster size of 10 contiguous voxels, which corresponds to a corrected
p<0.05 (using the AlphaSim program as described in Section Materials
and Methods).
by differential response of this system to the fallacious versus non-
fallacious responses in the implicit condition. This right hemi-
sphere frontal parietal system shows no differential sensitivity to
the explicit condition trials.) When one exhibits the fallacy in the
explicit condition (i.e., after being told that All birds have X) it may
be a function of oversight, or simply believing that the property of
the superordinate category does not generalize to this specific sub-
ordinate category (e.g., believing that most properties of robins do
not generalize to ostriches). However, the implicit condition facil-
itates the fallacy by introduction of uncertainty and ambiguity.
In the absence of an explicit quantifier, one may be less likely to
subsume the subordinate category in the superordinate category.
For example, the participant may reason that perhaps the sentence
means “most birds or virtually all birds. And after all, ostriches are
not real birds.” Under such an ambiguous interpretation, one is
more likely to make the inclusion fallacy.
These results differ in two important respects from our
expectations. First, the activation was not specific to the non-
fallacious condition (i.e., where the fallacious response is sup-
pressed), as we had predicted. Previous studies have reported
right PFC activation in detecting and/or overcoming conflict
in reasoning (Goel et al., 2000; Goel and Dolan, 2003; Aron
et al., 2004; Prado and Noveck, 2007; De Neys et al., 2008;
Stollstorff et al., 2011). However, there is evidence that falla-
cious responses are accompanied by an awareness of the con-
flict between the more logical response and the belief cued
response, even when the fallacious response is not suppressed
(De Neys, 2006a,b). The present results suggest that detection
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of conflict may be sufficient to activate this system. Second,
while several previous studies report right PFC activation for
conflict detection, Goel and Dolan (2003) also noted accompa-
nying activation in parietal cortex, even though it did not sur-
vive correction. The present results suggest a role of the parietal
system in conflict detection. Finally, the recruitment of the left
fusiform gyrus is consistent with semantic processing and retrieval
(Thompson-Schill et al., 1999; Devlin et al., 2006; Mion et al.,
2010).
In summary, our results show that a left fronto-temporal sys-
tem, along with bilateral medial superior frontal system, is specifi-
cally activated in the main effect of fallacy in response to biasing of
reasoning judgment by the semantic organization of knowledge.
A right fronto-parietal system, along with left fusiform gyrus, is
specifically recruited in the absence of explicit quantifiers, where
fallacious responses increase, as a function of increased uncer-
tainty and ambiguity. These activations may reflect an awareness
of the conflict between the selected response and logical response.
More generally, these results reinforce the involvement of multiple
systems in logical reasoning.
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